Jump to main content

LINK Mobility Group Holding ASA

At the General Meeting on 19 October 2026, Folketrygdfondet will vote against items 4, 5 and 6 for the following reasons:

Published: 10/13/2026
Last updated: 10/13/2026

Item 4: Remuneration Policy

We believe that board members should not participate in share-based incentive schemes, as this may undermine their independence and oversight responsibilities. We also believe that material differences in remuneration levels and structures among board members are undesirable, as they may create conflicting incentives and undermine the board’s collective responsibility.

Furthermore, the proposed long-term incentive framework lacks sufficiently robust performance conditions and a cap on potential financial gains. While we acknowledge certain improvements to the remuneration framework, we do not believe that the proposed policy is sufficiently aligned with principles of good corporate governance and the long-term interests of shareholders.

Item 5: Authority to Issue Shares (Incentive Programmes)

We will vote against the proposed authority to issue shares because it is intended to facilitate an incentive framework that we do not support. The underlying framework allows board members to participate in share-based incentive schemes, which may undermine their independence and oversight responsibilities.

The framework also lacks sufficiently robust performance conditions and a cap on potential financial gains. For these reasons, we do not believe that the proposed authority is sufficiently aligned with principles of good corporate governance and the long-term interests of shareholders.

Item 6: Remuneration of the Strategy Committee

We believe that board members should not participate in share option-based incentive schemes or take on additional assignments that may undermine their independence and oversight responsibilities. Furthermore, material differences in remuneration structures among board members may create conflicting incentives and undermine the board’s collective responsibility.

While we acknowledge the strategic rationale and the exceptional circumstances presented, we do not believe that the proposed arrangement is aligned with principles of good corporate governance.